Linguistic ersatzism and the problem of descriptive power
The story is a familiar one. We nd ourselves apparently quantifying over things we regard as ontologically objectionable. We therefore reinterpret this quanti cation as really being over things more easily accepted. The instance of the story at hand is the reduction of possible worlds to linguistic ersatz worlds.
A linguistic ersatz possible world is a maximal consistent set of sentences. To construct a possible world in which a donkey talks, we need only include the sentence 'A donkey talks' in a set, along with enough other sentences to insure that the set is not silent about any matter (maximality), but not so many that sentences in the set contradict each other (consistency). The notion of consistency here must be modal: a set is consistent iff it is possible that all the members of the set be true together. For mere logical consistency will not do: sets of sentences asserting the existence of married bachelors and round squares may be logically consistent but will not correspond to possible worlds. Unless modal consistency can be reduced in some way, linguistic ersatz worlds 7 See David Lewis, "Counterpart Theory and Quanti ed Modal Logic," Journal of Philosophy ( ): -. I defend counterpart theory (both modal and temporal) in my FourDimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ) .
cannot be used in a reductive analysis of modality, on pain of circularity. But the linguistic ersatzist can accept this limitation. The reduction of worlds to language still has a point, for it allows us to reduce all talk of worlds -which runs far beyond that which can be said utilizing merely the modal operatorsto talk of possibility and necessity. As for these, they may one day be reduced in some way that does not involve worlds, or they may remain primitive.
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Certain objections are quickly answered by taking a broad view of what counts in the present context as a sentence. Let us allow in nitely long sentences; 9 and let the language of those sentences be "Lagadonian", in that objects, properties and relations count as names of themselves, so that every actually existing object, property or relation has a name.
10 Natural languages are neither in nitary nor Lagadonian, but there is no need to take 'sentence' or 'language' very seriously. The worldmaking language need not be learnable or speakable (though the dif culty of writing Lagadonian sentences will require me to revert to English in examples). All that is needed is that its "sentences" have wellde ned meanings and be ontologically unobjectionable. These sentences can be understood as mathematical objects -in nite sequences of Lagadonian names, quanti ers, variables, and so on.
There are various ways to ll in this sketch of linguistic ersatzism 11 , but all face the following problem of descriptive power. 12 An actual language apparently cannot fully describe possibilities involving things that do not actually exist. The ersatzist can attempt to construct these possibilities using qualitative sentences describing what non-actual entities would be like. But such attempts con ate distinct possibilities. The problem comes in two forms, one involving nonactual individuals, the other involving non-actual fundamental properties and relations.
A possible world in which I am six feet tall may be constructed by embedding the sentence 'Ted is six feet tall' in a maximal consistent set of sentences. But one cannot thus construct an ersatz world in which some individual that does not actually exist is six feet tall, since we have no names for non-actual individuals. Instead, one must use a descriptive sentence:
There is some individual distinct from Ted, Tom, Dick, Harry, …, who is feet tall.
where the list 'Ted, Tom, Dick, Harry, …' includes a name for each actual individual. Worlds with non-actual individuals are thereby constructed from actualist descriptions of what those individuals would be like -descriptions that name only actual individuals and qualitative, general characteristics. But this procedure will never distinguish between worlds that differ solely over which non-actual individuals play which qualitative roles. We could construct a world in which one man wears a mask of a bat, drives a car and ghts crime with a younger masked chum named 'Robin'; but what of a distinct world in which the person who in the rst world wears the bat-mask is now named 'Robin', wears the Robin mask, and so on, and who is replaced in the Batman role by the person who wore the Robin mask in the rst world? No sentences in an actual worldmaking language will distinguish these worlds, so the current proposal identi es the apparently distinct worlds with a single set of sentences, and hence with each other. The objection assumes there can be qualitatively identical worlds differing in which qualitative roles are played by which individuals. This assumption is a controversial doctrine sometimes called haecceitism. Its opponents, antihaecceitists, say that worlds vary only in their qualitative descriptions; therefore the limitation of the linguist ersatzist to actualist descriptions is no limitation at all. Given my acceptance of counterpart theory, I accept anti-haecceitism and thus do not mind this limitation; but it is better to have an account of worlds that is independent of this controversial doctrine. There is, moreover, an analog to the objection that does not depend on haecceitism.
Possibilities involving non-actual properties, as well as individuals, must be accounted for. As before, the ersatzer can use descriptions of the roles such properties would play; but as before, such descriptions will not distinguish possible worlds in which non-actual properties swap roles.
There could have existed two fundamental types of matter, call them Amatter and B-matter, which do not actually exist, playing a certain nomic role which may be partially described as follows: A-matter attracts both negatively and positively charged things, whereas B-matter repels each. Let us understand "fundamental" so that neither supervenes on, or may be constructed in any way from, properties and relations instantiated in the actual world. How to construct an ersatz world corresponding to this possibility? We have no names for the properties since they do not in fact exist. Our best attempt will be to use descriptions, perhaps describing the roles in the laws of nature that Aand B-matter would play, or perhaps describing the pattern of distribution throughout spacetime A-and B-matter would have. Choosing the former course, let us embed the following sentence in a maximal consistent set:
( ) There are two fundamental properties, P and Q, such that i) neither P nor Q is identical to charge, charm, …, and ii) it is a law of nature that objects with P attract both negatively charged things and positively charged things, while objects with Q repel negatively and positively charged things
But we can also imagine a distinct world in which A-matter and B-matter have swapped nomic roles: in this new world it is B-matter rather than A-matter that attracts charged particles. Since neither sentence ( ) nor any other actual sentence will distinguish these worlds, linguistic ersatzism fails as a general reduction of possible worlds talk. Some will reply that since properties are abstract objects they exist necessarily (or better, that necessarily, every property exists necessarily). If the reply were correct then uninstantiated properties of being made up of A-matter and being made up of B-matter would exist in the actual world, could serve as Lagadonian names of themselves, and could be included in sentences that would distinguish the worlds in question. One could construct, for example, a sentence saying that objects made up of A-matter attract charged things, which would be true of the rst world but not the second.
13 But I cannot accept the reply, for two reasons.
14 First, it requires an ontology on which the existence of properties is radically independent of the goings-on of the concrete 13 An analogous reply may be made to the objects version of the problem of descriptive power, based on uninstantiated individual essences, as in section of Alvin Plantinga "Actualism and Possible Worlds", Theoria ( world. The theory of worlds should not be thus held hostage to the theory of properties. The properties required for the reply could not be sets of their instances (each would need to be the empty set; A-matter and B-matter would then be identi ed with each other). Nor could they be immanent universals (in the sense of D. M. Armstrong 15 ) which are supposed to be "wholly present in their instances" and incapable of existing uninstantiated. Even Michael Tooley, whose "transcendent" universals can exist uninstantiated in certain cases, would not accept uninstantiated universals of A-matter and B-matter. For Tooley, uninstantiated universals are accepted only when they play a role in the laws of nature, and we may stipulate that A-matter and B-matter play no role in the actual laws of nature.
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Note further that since the properties of being made up of A-matter and B-matter would be fundamental, they could not be constructed in any way, even by in nitary means, from less problematic properties, on any of the theories of properties just mentioned.
The second problem with the reply is its ontological extravagance. One of the main reasons to reduce worlds is parsimony. As Quine puts it colorfully, the believer in possibles accepts an "overpopulated" "bloated universe" which is "in many ways unlovely", and "offends the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes".
17 If non-actualized possibles bloat the universe, so would the actual but uninstantiated properties needed for the reply.
Neither reason for resisting uninstantiated fundamental properties is a reason for rejecting uninstantiated properties as such. On some views, complex properties are composed of or constructed from others, so that constructed uninstantiated properties would be no more objectionable than the properties from which they are constructed. My quarrel is with uninstantiated fundamental properties, which cannot be constructed from less problematic ones.
Just as the objects-version of the problem of descriptive power can be avoided by accepting a metaphysical thesis about individuals, namely antihaecceitism, the properties-version of the problem may be avoided by going in for certain metaphysical claims about properties. Shoemaker and Chris Swoyer are right that properties have their nomic roles essentially, then the problematic case of nomic role swapping is impossible.
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Alternatively, one could claim that the identity of a property is determined in some way by its pattern of instantiation. One could then safely account for alien fundamental properties without fear of con ating possibilities with descriptions of the patterns of instantiation such properties would have. 19 But a theory of worlds should be independent of these matters.
It seems that the linguistic ersatzer can solve the problem of descriptive power only by accepting both anti-haecceitism and some strong claim about the identity conditions for properties.
20 This is an unhappy situation. Using possible worlds talk should not commit one to controversial metaphysical doctrines.
A new approach to reducing worlds
Fortunately, such commitments can be avoided. A theory of worlds may be constructed that distinguishes possibilities in which non-actual individuals or fundamental properties swap roles, without making special assumptions about the metaphysics of individuals or properties.
Return to the worlds where A-matter and B-matter swap nomic roles. We cannot distinguish the worlds from within, by giving them different descriptions. But we can distinguish the worlds from an external perspective, so to speak. We can say: "there are two distinct worlds and a pair of non-actual properties; in one world the pair instantiates certain nomic roles; in the other world, the 20 Our survey of solutions has not been completely exhaustive. In "Actualism and Thisness", p. , Robert Adams, a haecceitist, paraphrases the sentence (RS): "there exist two possible worlds in which a pair of non-actual individuals swap roles" as, roughly, the assertion that there exists a possible world, w, according to which the following is true: there exist two non-actual individuals, x and y, and two ersatz possible worlds, w and w , that are alike except for an exchange of roles by x and y. But Adams paraphrases other sentences that quantify over worlds, for example "there exist two worlds, one in which a donkey talks, another in which a blue sh walks" as genuine quanti cations over ersatz worlds (for Adams, maximal consistent sets of propositions). A uniform treatment would be preferable. nomic roles of the properties are reversed".
The theory I propose departs radically from linguistic ersatzism. I do away with ersatz worlds and individuals in reducing worlds talk, and instead use a single "ersatz pluriverse", a single abstract entity that represents the totality of possible worlds and individuals all at once. Two ways of carrying out this idea will be considered below; here I consider the version in which the surrogate is a pluriverse sentence, which looks roughly as follows:
THERE ARE worlds w 1 , w 2 , …and THERE ARE properties and relations P 1 , P 2 …that are distinct from the following actual properties and relations: …, and THERE ARE possible individuals x 1 , x 2 , …that are distinct from the following actual individuals: …, SUCH THAT: …w 1 …and …w 2 …and … At the end of the existentially quanti ed pluriverse sentence, there are conjoined open formulas, one for each possible world. One of these "world-conjuncts" might look like this: "x 1 is in w 1 , and has property P 2 , and …". The language of the pluriverse sentence must be an in nitary language, since there will need to be in nitely many existential quanti ers and in nitely many world conjuncts, and also some in nitely long world conjuncts.
This requires a departure from the usual way of reducing possible worlds talk. Most familiar reductions are "entity-for-entity" reductions, in that they provide a surrogate entity for each entity to be reduced, an abstract surrogate for each possible world.
21 I propose instead a "holistic" reduction. Instead of individual world-surrogates I offer a single pluriverse-surrogate. Worlds talk cannot, therefore, be talk about possible world surrogates; it must instead be talk about the single surrogate. Suppose we want to say that there is a possible world in which a donkey talks. The usual reductionist paraphrase is that there is a possible world surrogate of some sort according to which a donkey talks. (The linguistic ersatzist's surrogate is a maximal consistent set of sentences; other theories provide other surrogates.) On the pluriverse view we say instead: according to the pluriverse sentence, there is a possible world in which a donkey talks. Thus, quanti cation over possibles is interpreted, not as quanti cation over surrogates, but rather as truth of a quanti ed sentence according to a single surrogate. When I speak of what is true according to the ersatz pluriverse, I am not proposing that we take 'according to' as a mysterious or novel primitive. (This is in contrast to Gideon Rosen's modal ctionalism, which I discuss below.) "According to" just means logical entailment of a sort to be explained. (The entailment must not be strict implication, in the sense of the necessity of the material conditional, for it may well be impossible that the pluriverse sentence is true, in which case the pluriverse sentence would strictly imply every sentence.) Thus, a sentence S quantifying over possibilia is reinterpreted as the claim that the pluriverse sentence logically entails S.
A "strict and philosophical" interpretation of quanti cation over worlds must be distinguished from a more everyday interpretation. I use the words "there are no possible worlds" to deny modal realism, and yet I quantify over worlds when such quanti cation is reduced via the ersatz pluriverse. The former denial is not intended to receive the ersatz pluriverse analysis. What does get analyzed is quanti cation over possibilia by philosophers and linguists, as well as ordinary quanti cation over possibilities, for example when a chess master remarks that there are at least ve possibilities for winning a certain chess match.
This holistic approach to reducing worlds is attractive. The object of the reduction is the entire pluriverse, so it is natural to produce a surrogate for that entity. Moreover, the method of representation of this surrogate is parallel to that of linguistic ersatzism. A maximal consistent set of sentences represents a state of affairs iff that set contains sentences that entail that the state of affairs obtains. The pluriverse sentence also represents by entailment: it represents there being a certain sort of world or possible individual by (logically) entailing that such a world or individual exists.
Even before it is spelled out in detail, the pluriverse view can be seen to solve the problem of descriptive power. Assuming properties have neither their nomic roles nor their patterns of distribution essentially, any adequate theory of worlds should allow a pair of possible worlds in which two nonactual fundamental properties swap nomic roles. On the pluriverse view, the sentence "there are such and such possible worlds" is reinterpreted as: "the pluriverse sentence entails that there are such and such possible worlds". Provided the pluriverse sentence is spelled out appropriately, it will logically entail the following sentence asserting the existence of the desired pair of worlds: (*) there are two worlds, w 1 and w 2 , and two non-actual, fundamental properties, P 1 and P 2 , such that: P 1 plays nomic role R 1 in w 1 and P 2 plays nomic role R 2 in w 1 , and P 1 plays nomic role R 2 in w 2 and P 2 plays nomic role R 1 in w 2 .
Haecceitists could give a similar response to the problem of alien individualsthe pluriverse sentence could be spelled out so that it entails the sentence:
(**) there are two worlds, w 1 and w 2 , and two non-actual individuals x 1 and x 2 , such that: x 1 plays qualitative role R 1 in w 1 and x 2 plays qualitative role R 2 in w 1 , and x 1 plays qualitative role R 2 in w 2 and x 2 plays qualitative role R 1 in w 2 .
(Since I am no haecceitist, I choose not to spell out the pluriverse sentence in this way; instead I reject the existence of worlds differing only by what individuals play what qualitative roles.) The linguistic ersatzer had to represent non-actual individuals and properties by including existentially quanti ed sentences within ersatz worlds:
But then one ersatz world could not make any assertions about a particular nonactual individual represented within another, since the variables for non-actual individuals were bound to quanti ers that occurred only within ersatz worlds. The solution is to move the existential quanti ers outside of the individual world surrogates, to bind occurrences of variables within multiple world surrogates:
Provided that the details of the pluriverse theory can be adequately lled in, the problem of descriptive power has been solved. The next section concerns those details. I will develop the pluriverse view within a broadly linguistic ersatzist framework, but my solution to the problem of descriptive power is quite general. Other theories face the problem, and can bene t from the pluriverse strategy. Robert Merrihew Adams, Alvin Plantinga, or Robert Stalnaker could convert their non-linguistic abstract possible worlds into a single non-linguistic abstract pluriverse. Likewise, D. M. Armstrong could incorporate my methods into his combinatorial theory. 
The construction of the ersatz pluriverse
In the present section I provide a rigorous construction of the ersatz pluriverse.
In outline, the construction will run as follows. I will introduce modal models, which are similar to Kripke models. Modal models will be called realistic when they are faithful to the modal facts. The modal facts will be stated in a modal language (containing the 2 and 3); truths in this language will determine which modal models are realistic. A second language, the possibilist language, contains the sentences to be reduced -sentences about possibilia. The proposed reduction comes in two versions. The version alluded to in the previous section utilizes pluriverse sentences, which are constructed in the possibilist language as maximal descriptions of realistic models. At the end I introduce a non-linguistic version that uses realistic models directly: a sentence, S, in the possibilist language is reinterpreted as meaning that S is true in all realistic models.
Two languages
I begin with a speci cation of a possibilist language, a language with the resources to describe possible worlds and individuals. This language is in essence the world-making language used by the linguistic ersatzer. Pluriverse sentences will be sentences of this language. Additionally, the possibilist language contains the target sentences of the reduction, those sentences about possibilia that are to be analyzed. Lewis distinguishes between "rich" and "poor" worldmaking languages. A poor language names only a select few properties and relations, perhaps those of fundamental physics, and therefore will remain silent about many matters. I will use instead a rich language, a language with a Lagadonian name for every (actual, concrete) individual, and a Lagadonian name for every (actual) property and relation (from now on, just "property"). 23 The Lagadonian names of properties should include higher-order properties of properties (so that sentences like (*) from the previous section may be formulated). Note the use of properties as Lagadonian names rather than predicates. Given this, the language must also include an instantiation predicate. It will be convenient to make the instantiation predicate multigrade; thus, 'x instantiates P ' and 'x and y instantiate R' are both well-formed. The sentences of this language are just sequences of the bits of primitive vocabulary, for example Lagadonian names, the instantiation predicate, quanti ers, Boolean connectives, and so on. The pluriverse theory thus requires set theory, plus the existence of properties and relations (which are the Lagadonian names of themselves) -defending nominalism is not my concern here. The language is in nitary both in allowing in nite sentences and also in nite blocks of quanti ers, in each case of arbitrarily long in nite length (I discuss cardinality worries in section 4.1 below.) The language contains no modal operators. Instead, it contains resources to speak explicitly about worlds: a syntactically distinct category of world-variables w i , an individual constant @ for the actual world, and a two-place predicate 'exists in'.
Quanti cation in the possibilist language is rst-order. But since the pluriverse theory is to be combined with counterpart theory, there must be certain differences between quanti cation over individuals and over properties, since the ersatz pluriverse must represent the former but not the latter as being worldbound. Variables for properties are syntactically distinct from variables for individuals; and individual constants for (actual) individuals are syntactically distinct from constants naming (actual) properties. 24 Since individuals are to be represented as worldbound, the instantiation of properties by individuals may be represented as being instantiation simpliciter. However, the properties will be represented as recurring in different worlds (as in sentence (*) above); hence the ersatz pluriverse must represent higher order properties as being instantiated at worlds. Thus, a distinct predicate for higher-order instantiation must be introduced, multigrade as before, but with an extra place for worlds "P 1 , …, P n instantiate Q at w". Within the class of property constants and variables, let there also be a syntactic distinction between those for properties of individuals (type ), and higher order (type ) properties of properties; and let there be a syntactically associated number of places with each property constant, namely, the number of places of that Lagadonian constant itself. (Syntactically, the constants are names, not predicates, so the number of places does not affect grammar; rather it will constrain the interpretation of these constants within models.)
The second language is the modal language. This language differs from the possibilist language by dropping the world variables, @, and 'exists in', and including in their place the modal operators 2 and 3 and a sentential actuality operator. Moreover, the predicate for higher-order instantiation in the modal language no longer has an argument place for worlds. Otherwise, the modal language is like the possibilist language: it is an in nitary rstorder language with Lagadonian names for all actual concrete individuals and properties, and syntactic distinctions between constants and variables for individuals and properties.
Modal models
My modal models are familiar: they are based on a structure in which "possible individuals" instantiate "possible properties and relations" in different "possible worlds". I use scare-quotes here because these elements of modal models are not to be taken with ontological seriousness: the set of "worlds" in a modal model may contain anything at all -numbers, people, sh, pure sets, and so on. That this will not limit the ersatz pluriverse account to purely formal uses of worlds will be made clear in section 3.8 below.
Leaving out accessibility for simplicity, a modal structure will be understood as a -tuple 〈W, r, D, P, Q, I〉 where:
• W is a non-empty set (the set of "worlds")
• r is some member of W ("the actual world")
• D is a set (the set of "individuals")
• P is a set (the set of "properties"). Each member of P is to have two associated integers. The rst integer (≥ ) is the "number of places" of the property; the second ( or ) is the "type" of the property: type for properties of individuals, type for properties of properties.
• No two of W, D, and P overlap
• Q is a function that assigns to each world w an ordered pair 〈D w ,P w 〉, where D w ⊆ D and P w ⊆ P. (D w and P w are to be thought of as the individuals and properties existing in w.) We impose the requirement of worldbound individuals: that if w =w' then D w and D w do not overlap. Overlap of distinct P w 's is permitted -thus transworld identity of properties is represented.
• I is a function that assigns to each n-place p ∈ P an n-place intension. If p is type then the intension of p is a function that assigns to each world w a set of n-tuples drawn from D w (the "extension of p in w"). If p is type then its intension assigns to each w a set of n-tuples of members of P w . The requirement that if p / ∈ P w then the extension of p in w is empty should presumably be imposed.
Both the modal language and the possibilist language may be interpreted in these modal structures. The Lagadonian names are common to both languages, and thus each language may be given the same de nition of a modal model, which may be understood as a modal structure plus an interpretation function F that assigns denotations to these names:
• to each individual constant, F assigns some member of D r
• to each Lagadonian name for a n-place property of type m (m = or ), F assigns some n-place member of P r of type m
The de nition of truth in a given modal model must be different for our two languages. For the modal language, the de nition is more or less the usual one, subject to the following remarks. As usual, one de nes truth-in-a-world recursively; truth in a model is then truth in the actual world of that model. α 1 , …α n instantiates Π (relative to an assignment to the variables; this will be suppressed from now on) is true at w iff the ordered n-tuple of the referents of the terms α 1 , …α n is in the extension, at w, of the property denoted by Π. (Thus, in a sense, the meaning of the instantiation predicate is "hard-wired" into the de nition of truth in a model.) Necessity is truth in all worlds; possibility, truth in some world; actuality, truth in the actual world (r). The language is in nitary, so the usual truth conditions for in nite conjunctions and in nite blocks of quanti ers must be adapted to the modal case in the natural way.
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The quanti ers are actualist; thus, the individual variables range, at a world w, over D w , the lower order property variables over the type members of P w , and the higher order property variables over the type members of P w .
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For the possibilist language, truth-in-a-model must be understood differently. Since the possibilist language contains no modal operators, we do not de ne truth in worlds, but rather truth simpliciter. The modal model is now treated much like an ordinary non-modal model, with domains for three sorts of variables: the world variables range over W, the individual variables over the whole of D, the property variables over all of the members of P with the appropriate type. When α 1 , …, α n are terms for individuals, α 1 , …, α n instantiate Π is true iff the denotations of α 1 , …, α n are all in the same world, w, and the n-tuple of these denotations is in the extension in w of the denotation of Π. If Π 1 , …, Π n , and Π are terms for properties, and ω is a term for a world (either a world variable or @), then Π 1 , …, Π n instantiate Π at ω is true iff the n-tuple of the denotations of the Π i 's is in the extension at the denotation of ω of the denotation of Π.The predicate 'exists in' and the constant @ must have "hard-wired" meanings, in the sense that they will always be given the same interpretation in the models:
• The denotation of @ is r
• α exists in ω , where α is an individual (property) term and ω is a world term, is true iff a∈D w (iff a∈P w ), where a and w are the referents of α and ω, respectively
We have, then, a single conception of a modal model, but two de nitions of truth in a modal model, call them "truth p " and "truth m ", for the possibilist and modal languages, respectively. There are two model-theoretic notions of entailment (and thus of equivalence) corresponding to these notions: a sentence in the possibilist (modal) language entails p (entails m ) another iff the latter is true p (true m ) in every modal model in which the rst is true p (true m ). The construction has assumed worldbound individuals, to make room for counterpart theory (section III. F.). If this assumption were given up, various changes would need to be made, including adding a place for worlds to the instantiation predicate for properties of individuals, making appropriate revisions to the de nition of truth m , and allowing domains of distinct worlds in modal models to overlap.
Realistic modal models
Since the ersatz pluriverse is intended to represent the space of possible worlds, it had better not imply the existence of worlds with married bachelors, round squares and the like. Just as linguistic ersatzers make use of a modal notion of consistency, I will make use of the modal notions of possibility and necessity in constructing the ersatz pluriverse. More speci cally, I assume the notion of sentences in the modal language being true under a Lagadonian interpretation, or "L-true" for short. On this interpretation, the Lagadonian names (of both individuals and properties and relations) are interpreted as denoting themselves, the instantiation predicate is interpreted as meaning instantiation, and the modal operators 2 and 3 are interpreted as meaning necessity and possibility, respectively. L-truth must be sharply distinguished from both truth p and truth m , each of which holds only relative to modal models. L-truth does not concern modal models, but rather the "real live modal facts".
A certain class, CONSTRAINTS, of L-true sentences in the modal language will be used to construct the ersatz pluriverse. Which sentences, exactly, should be included in CONSTRAINTS? The truth of the members of CON-STRAINTS will be, in essence, "built-into" the ersatz pluriverse. Since I give a counterpart-theoretic account of de re modal sentences below, I do not want truth values for these sentences built into the ersatz pluriverse from the start. Thus, CONSTRAINTS will consist of exactly the L-true de dicto sentences in the modal language -i.e., the L-true sentences in the modal language that contain neither i) individual variables in modal contexts bound by quanti ers outside those contexts, nor ii) Lagadonian names of actual individuals in modal contexts. (If the theory is not to be coupled with counterpart theory then CONSTRAINTS may include all L-true sentences of the modal language.) Call any modal model M in which every member of CONSTRAINTS is true m a realistic modal model. The modal language allows arbitrarily long formulas, so strictly speaking CONSTRAINTS cannot exist as a set: understand the de nition as saying that a realistic model is one in which every sentence in the modal language satisfying the membership condition for CONSTRAINTS is true m . Thus, a realistic modal model is a modal model M such that for every de dicto sentence, S, in the modal language, if S is L-true then S is true m in M. A realistic model is a model of logical space that is as accurate as possible, given that we have only truths expressible in the modal language to guide us in its construction.
Pluriverse sentences
De ne a pluriverse sentence as any maximal description of any realistic model, where a maximal description of M is a sentence in the possibilist language that is true p in M and which entails p any other sentence in the possibilist language that is true p in M. More than one sentence will satisfy this de nition, so I must cease the pretense of uniqueness.
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We need to know that pluriverse sentences do indeed exist. The remainder of this section sketches a proof that every realistic model has a maximal description. So assuming that realistic models exist, pluriverse sentences exist.
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This section may be skipped with little danger to understanding the rest of the paper.
We rst de ne the concept of isomorphic modal models in the obvious way: iii) i∈D w iff f(i)∈D f (w) , for any i∈D and any w∈W iv) i∈P w iff f(i)∈P f (w) , for any i∈P and any w∈W v) 〈i 1 , …, i n 〉 ∈ I(j)(w) iff 〈f(i 1 ), …, f(i n )〉 ∈ I (f(j))(f(w)), for any w∈W, any n-place j∈P of type , and any
, for any w∈W, any n-place j∈P of type , and any i 1 , …i n in P w 27 Distinct logically equivalent pluriverse sentences are harmless. It is unclear to me at present whether a harmful multiplicity arises from CONSTRAINTS failing to constrain realistic models up to isomorphism.
28 One challenge to the existence of realistic models is discussed in section 4.1. A separate challenge: realistic models will not exist, given the current de nitions, if the logic of the sentences in CONSTRAINTS is not S . In that case, an accessibility relation would need to be introduced into realistic models, a predicate for accessibility added to the possibilist language, and the de nitions of truth m and truth p adjusted accordingly. vii) F (β) = f(F(β)), for every property or individual constant β The following will be proved below:
Theorem for any realistic modal model M, there exists a sentence φ of the possibilist language (the "canonical pluriverse sentence for M") that is true p in M, and which is such that if it is true p in an arbitrary modal model M then M is isomorphic to M It is obvious that the same sentences in the possibilist language will be true p in isomorphic models. Hence, it follows from the theorem that in any modal model there is a true p sentence, in "canonical form", that entails p every other sentence in the possibilist language that is true p in that model -a pluriverse sentence for that model. Given the de nition of a pluriverse sentence, it then follows immediately that any pluriverse sentence is equivalent p to some pluriverse sentence in canonical form.
To prove the theorem, consider any modal model M (= 〈W,r,D,P,Q,I〉 + interpretation F). The following notation will be used: (φ: …φ…): the (possibly in nitary) conjunction of the class of formulas φ satisfying condition …φ…. Similarly for disjunction: (φ: …φ…). Let the disjunction of the empty set be some logically false sentence, such as ∃x x = x; let the conjunction of the empty set be some logically true sentence.
w, w i , etc., are world variables; x, y, x i , etc. are individual variables; P , P i , Q, etc., are property variables (of either higher or lower type).
Every member of D r is denoted by (i.e., is assigned by F to) some individual constant: since we have an individual Lagadonian constant for every (actual) individual, the following sentence in the modal language is L-true, and so must be true m in M, and so must be true m at r: ∀x (x=a: a is an individual constant) Since the constants are Lagadonian, the sentence a =b is L-true and so true m in M whenever a and b are distinct individual constants. Thus, every member of D r is denoted in M by a unique individual constant. It can be shown similarly that every member of P r is denoted by a unique property constant. Next:
For each i∈W other than r, introduce a distinct world variable w i .
For each i∈D but not in D r , introduce a distinct individual variable x i .
For each i∈P but not in P r , introduce a distinct property variable P i .
For each i∈D r , call the individual constant denoting i in M "a i "
For each i∈P r , call the individual constant denoting i in M "p i "
To simplify the various special cases that arise in connection with the actual world r, let us introduce the following abbreviations:
For any i∈P, let "Π i " denote either the constant p i or the variable P i , depending on whether i is, or is not, in P r For any i∈D, let "α i " denote either the constant a i or the variable x i , depending on whether i is, or is not, in D r .
For any i∈W, let "ω i " denote either the constant @ or the variable w i , depending on whether i is, or is not, r.
We now construct the required pluriverse sentence φ as follows:
and
is an n-place type member of P]
Remarks: DISTINCTNESS ensures that no two property or individual terms, whether variables or constants, denote the same thing. COMPLETENESS says that there are no worlds other than those denoted by @ and the variables w i , and no individuals or properties other than those denoted by the Lagadonian constants and the variables x i and p i . The rst component of the world conjunct W i says that the individuals and properties in world i are exactly those denoted by the terms α j and Π j . The second component contains an in nite conjunction, one conjunct for each lower order property; each of these conjuncts says, for the property in question, that the individuals that satisfy the property in i are exactly such and such. The third does the same thing for all of the higher-order properties.
It is tedious but straightforward to verify that any model in which φ is true p is isomorphic to M.
The proposal: linguistic version
Let S be any sentence of the possibilist language, and think of S under the Lagadonian interpretation, as a sentence concerning reality, not any modal model. S might be the sort of sentence that proves so useful in philosophy or linguistics, quantifying over non-actual worlds, individuals and properties. Only a modal realist like Lewis could admit the truth of such a sentencehence the need for a reduction. So:
Proposal (linguistic version) Reinterpret S as the assertion that
S is entailed p by all pluriverse sentences.
Since the proposal only generates truth conditions for sentences stated within the Lagadonian possibilist language, English sentences about possibilia must be regimented in that language. For example, an English subject-predicate atomic sentence Fa may be translated as the Lagadonian sentence α instantiates π , where α is a Lagadonian name for the referent of a, and π is a Lagadonian name for the property expressed by F . Let us examine pluriverse sentences in more depth. First, pluriverse sentences need not have the logical form introduced in section II: THERE ARE worlds w 1 , w 2 , …and THERE ARE properties and relations P 1 , P 2 …that are distinct from the following actual properties and relations: …, and THERE ARE possible individuals x 1 , x 2 , …that are distinct from the following actual individuals: …, SUCH THAT: …w 1 …and …w 2 …and …. beginning with quanti ers for the worlds, properties, and individuals, and concluding with an in nite conjunction of open sentences -world conjuncts -one for each world variable. Maximal descriptions of modal models need not have this logical form. However, as was shown in the previous section, every pluriverse sentence is equivalent p to some such sentence, which I call a canonical pluriverse sentence. It is harmless, therefore, to think of pluriverse sentences as having this canonical form.
Second, no pluriverse sentence can assert the existence of a world in which impossibilities occur. Suppose a world conjunct in some pluriverse sentence contained 'x exists at w' and 'x is a married bachelor'. Any pluriverse sentence is true p in some realistic model; so some individual in the domain of some world of some realistic model would be in the extension of 'married bachelor' in that world. But this is impossible, since the sentence ' there exist no married bachelors' is L-true, and so is a member of CONSTRAINTS, and so must be true m in any realistic model. Third, every possibility will be represented as holding in some world, by any pluriverse sentence. Where M is any realistic model, if 3φ is an Ltruth of the modal language then it must be true m in M, in which case φ will be true m in some world of M. But then any pluriverse sentence based on M will entail p a sentence asserting that φ holds in some world. Notice that φ might be an in nitary sentence since the modal and possibilist languages allow such sentences; thus, there is no restriction to nitely stateable possibilities. Relatedly, pluriverse sentences will represent necessary truths as holding in every possible world. Thus, on the pluriverse view, truths about possibility and necessity in the modal language "mesh" with their worlds translations.
Fourth, the possible worlds represented by the world conjuncts in pluriverse sentences are "completely speci c". Suppose a pluriverse sentence φ entails p the following:
There exists a world, an individual x existing at that world, and properties P 1 …P n and Q existing at that world, such that x has properties P 1 …P n .
It must then entail p one of the following:
There exists a world, an individual x existing at that world, and properties P 1 …P n and Q existing at that world, such that x has properties P 1 …P n as well as Q There exists a world, an individual x existing at that world, and properties P 1 …P n and Q existing at that world, such that x has properties P 1 …P n , but not Q For if φ is a pluriverse sentence then it is a maximal description of some modal model M; if φ entails p the rst sentence then that sentence is true p in M; but then either the second or third sentence must be true p in M, and hence one must be entailed p by φ.
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Fifth, as constructed in the previous section, each pluriverse sentence in canonical form contains a clause COMPLETENESS asserting that its inventory of worlds, individuals, and properties is complete: 29 I ignore vagueness throughout.
THERE ARE worlds w 1 , w 2 , …and THERE ARE properties and relations P 1 , P 2 …that are distinct from the following actual properties and relations: …, and THERE ARE possible individuals x 1 , x 2 , …that are distinct from the following actual individuals: …, SUCH THAT: COMPLETENESS and …w 1 …and …w 2 …and … The clause COMPLETENESS looks like this:
COMPLETENESS: there are no worlds other than @, w 1 , w 2 , …, and there are no properties or relations other than charge, charm, [list all actual properties and relations], and P 1 , P 2 …, and there are no possible individuals other than Socrates, Aristotle, [list all actual individuals], and x 1 , x 2 , … If a pluriverse sentence entailed p no such clause it could not be a maximal description of any realistic model, for it would fail to entail p many of the universally quanti ed sentences true p in that realistic model. Sixth, each pluriverse sentence will include information about the actual world. For any n-place property Π and any n objects α 1 …α n that, in fact, instantiate Π, the atomic sentence in the modal language, α 1 …α n instantiate Π , is L-true, and so is in CONSTRAINTS, and so is true m in any realistic modal model. Let M be any realistic model, and let r be the actual world of M. Given the de nition of a modal model, D r contains the denotations a 1 …a n of α 1 …α n , and P r contains p, the denotation of Π. By the de nition of truth m , 〈a 1 ,…,a n 〉 is in the extension of p at r in M. Thus, in any realistic modal model, the actual world r will encode all the non-modal truths about the (real) actual world. This information nds its way into pluriverse sentences as follows. Given what we have said, the following sentence of the possibilist language must be true p in any realistic model:
(@) Π exists in @, α 1 …α n exist in @, and α 1 …α n instantiate Π It must, therefore, be entailed p by any pluriverse sentence. Therefore: L-true non-modal subject-predicate propositions are reported by pluriverse sentences as holding in the actual world. (Each pluriverse sentence φ in canonical form will collect all the information contained in sentences like (@) into a single actual world conjunct -the one of the world conjuncts that completely describes r, the actual world of the model on which φ is based.) Seventh, pluriverse sentences say more about worlds than they say about them individually; they do not merely entail p sentences of the form there exists a world such that φ . Suppose that property variable P occurs in world conjuncts W 1 and W 2 (which in turn correspond to world variables w 1 and w 2 ) in some pluriverse sentence. It will then entail p :
there exists a property P , and worlds w 1 and w 2 , such that W 1 and W 2
This sort of consequence, a claim about two worlds "from an external perspective", is what makes possible the solution to the problem of descriptive power.
Inter-world facts
Though the bare-bones pluriverse theory is now in place, several additions are needed to yield a complete theory of worlds. The present section will sketch, in considerably less detail than the preceding sections, how some of this might be carried out.
To gain the full bene ts of talk of possibilia, "paradise on the cheap" as Lewis says, we want to speak, not only of possibilia, but also of set-theoretic constructions of possibilia. Chalmers's two-dimensional framework, for example, requires functions de ned over possible worlds and individuals. Ersatz pluriverses must therefore represent sets of worlds, individuals, and properties in addition to the worlds, individuals and properties themselves. To accomplish this, the language of set theory could be added to the possibilist language, and the de nition of truth p in a modal model modi ed so that sentences containing set-theoretic vocabulary are true p in M iff they accurately describe M's set-theoretic structure, in the following sense. M's set of "worlds", W is a certain set, and thus has a certain set-theoretic structure: it has certain subsets, which themselves have subsets, and so on. Similarly, M's set of individuals, D, has a certain set-theoretic structure. W and D do not need to be augmented to represent their set-theoretic structures; they simply have their structures. The de nition of truth p must be modi ed so that a set-theoretic sentence in the possibilist language turns out true p in M iff it correctly represents the set-theoretic structure that M has. Thus, the very same pluriverse sentences de ned above will now entail p set-theoretic sentences, despite containing no set-theoretic vocabulary. Sentences about sets of possibilia will be entailed p by any pluriverse sentence, and so will turn out true, on the pluriverse view.
Facts about sets of possibilia are "inter-world" facts -facts not from the perspective of any one world, but rather from an external perspective. There are other examples of such facts: i) the pluriverse should, perhaps, represent the existence of transworld mereological sums; ii) the pluriverse should, perhaps, represent relations holding between inhabitants of worlds and transworld sets or sums, for example belief relations between persons and transworld sets thought of as propositions; iii) the pluriverse should represent the holding of a counterpart relation between objects from different worlds. To achieve these goals the possibilist language must be enriched, modal models must be augmented to represent the desired facts, and the de nition of truth p must be adjusted accordingly.
The addition of counterpart theory to the pluriverse view will illustrate some of the complications that can arise with these additions. Where M is any modal model and C is a binary relation over M's domain, D, call 〈M,C〉 a C-model. C is to be thought of as the counterpart relation for M. (A re nement would be to allow multiple counterpart relations.) 30 We now need the notion of a realistic C-model. Since the counterpart relation is a similarity relation (although not necessarily a relation of intrinsic similarity), whether it holds depends on what properties are instantiated by its relata and what relations its relata bear to their worldmates. Thus, for 〈M,C〉 to be realistic, it is not enough for M to be realistic; in addition the holding of C must "mesh" with the properties instantiated by the objects in that model. This is not speci c to counterpart theory: inter-world relations will usually be constrained by the intra-world facts about their relata.
In fact, the counterpart relation seems determined by intra-world facts. (Whether this is true in general, or whether some interesting inter-world relations are constrained without being determined by intra-world facts, is debatable.) Thus, there should be a function, c-determination, which when applied to a realistic modal model M yields the appropriate counterpart relation, C, over the individuals of M. Given this function we can then de ne the notion of a realistic C-model: 〈M,C〉 is realistic iff M is realistic and C = cdetermination(M). Thus, our problem of de ning 'realistic C-model' reduces to the problem of de ning 'c-determination'.
The latter would be easy if we had a particular theory of the counterpart relation. Suppose, for example, that x is a counterpart of y iff x and y both instantiate a certain property P. Then we could de ne c-determination(M) as the relation that holds between members of M's domain x and y iff both x and y are in the extension of P in their respective worlds. But the counterpart relation is often taken as an unde ned primitive (although explained intuitively in terms of similarity).
One could replace the primitive counterpart relation with a new primitive, that of c-determination. C-determination could be explained informally in terms of similarity and so would count as a kind of similarity primitive. But C-determination would be an unwieldy primitive. It would be better to de ne it in terms of (the relevant sort of) similarity itself, and then take the latter as primitive instead. Under certain assumptions this is in fact possible.
Here is a sketch of a de nition of 'c-determination' in terms of a similarity predicate 'c-similar'. Consider any modal model, M, containing individuals x 1 and x 2 , from worlds w 1 and w 2 , respectively. Form a pair of open formulas W 1 and W 2 of the possibilist language describing w 1 and w 2 as follows. Represent each of the individuals and properties in the two worlds with distinct terms, letting any properties from the actual world of the model be represented by the Lagadonian constants which denote those properties in the model, and letting all individuals (whether in the actual world of the model or no) and all non-actual properties be represented by variables. Let x 1 and x 2 be the variables corresponding to individuals x 1 and x 2 , respectively; let α 1 ,…be a list of all the variables other than x 1 used to represent things from w 1 , and let β 1 ,…be a list of all variables other than x 2 used for w 2 . Next, in the manner of section 3.4, using these variables construct (possibly in nite) open formulas W 1 and W 2 that completely describe the pattern of instantiation of properties within worlds w 1 and w 2 . We now say that c-determination(M) holds between x 1 and x 2 iff the following is an L-true sentence of the modal language:
Necessarily, for all x 1 , α 1 ,…, and for all distinct x 2 , β 1 ,…, if W 1 and W 2 , then x 1 and x 2 are c-similar ("any objects that are as W 1 and W 2 say that x 1 and x 2 are would necessarily be c-similar"). A potential problem, however, is that W 1 and W 2 may not be satis able by distinct sets of objects -perhaps there is no one possible world containing wholly distinct parts that are as described by W 1 and W 2 . In this case the de nition will hold vacuously, in virtue of the antecedent of the conditional, if W 1 and W 2 , then… , being necessarily false. W 1 and W 2 express massive conditions that are satis ed by all the objects in some possible world of some modal model. 31 The following principle would ensure that the de nition never holds vacuously: for any two possible worlds, there exists another possible world containing distinct duplicates of the rst two worlds. If the principle is true then the conditionals in the de nition will not be vacuous, for even though W 1 and W 2 describe two entire possible worlds, there will also be a third world containing two parts, one with objects that satisfy W 1 , the other with objects that satisfy W 2 . But this principle is controversial.
Reliance on this principle could be avoided if we were willing to accept non-vacuous counterfactual conditionals with metaphysically impossible antecedents 32 : we could then say that c-determination(M) holds between x 1 and x 2 iff the following is L-true:
If there had existed x 1 , α 1 ,…, and distinct x 2 , β 1 ,…, such that W 1 and W 2 , then it would have been the case that x 1 and x 2 are (relevantly) similar
The cost here would be accepting this counterfactual connective as a new modal primitive.
Whether 'c-determination' is a primitive or is de ned in terms of 'c-similar', realistic models can represent the holding of a counterpart relation over possibilia.
The proposal, non-linguistic version
Realistic models were used to de ne pluriverse sentences, which then were used to reinterpret sentences about possibilia. But one could bypass the pluriverse sentences and utilize realistic models directly: Given the theorem of section 3.4, the linguistic and non-linguistic versions of the proposal are equivalent. 34 The non-linguistic version is simpler, but I nd the linguistic version more intuitive. The linguistic version also facilitates comparison with other theories, for instance linguistic ersatzism and modal ctionalism (to be discussed below).
Taking stock
Our inquiry into the ontology of worlds has been driven by the dilemma: Lewisian modal realism is unacceptable, yet possibilia are useful in semantics and ontology. My solution is the proposal sketched in the preceding sections. The proposal is super cially similar to the use of Kripke models as "mere structures" since the particular entities in the sets of "worlds", "individuals" and "properties" in modal models are insigni cant; these sets may, for example, 34 To prove: S is true p in all realistic models iff S is entailed p by all pluriverse sentences. First consider the proposal before the introduction of set-theoretic vocabulary discussed in 3.6.
Let S be true p in all realistic models, let PS be a pluriverse sentence, and suppose that PS is true p in some modal model M. Since PS is a pluriverse sentence, it is a maximal description of some realistic model M . S is true p in M , and so is entailed p by PS, and so is true p in M.
On the other hand, suppose S is entailed p by all pluriverse sentences, and let M be a realistic model. By the theorem of III. D., some pluriverse sentence is true p in M; it entails p S, and so S is true p in M as well. Now consider the introduction of set-theoretic vocabulary from 3.6. The proof just given relies only on i) de nitions which have not changed, and ii) the theorem of III. D., that in each realistic modal model there is a true p pluriverse sentence. Thus, all we must show is that the theorem holds under the new de nition of truth p . That theorem established the existence of a sentence φ that characterizes a given modal model up to isomorphism. But isomorphic models have the same set-theoretic structure, and hence make the same sentences of the new, set-theoretic possibilist language true p . Thus, φ remains a pluriverse sentence for the model, under the new de nition.
Notice that φ now has new entailments p (namely, set-theoretic sentences) without having anything added to it, given the new de nition of entailment p . Pluriverse sentences could not have characterized all of the set-theoretic facts by name, via Lagadonian names of all the sets in the hierarchy generated by a given model, for then pluriverse sentences could not exist.
Pluriverse sentences still do not entail p statements about sets existing in worlds; how then can the L-truth of '2(the empty set exists)' be accommodated? Probably the best solution is to follow Lewis in regarding the worlds translation of such a sentence as involving a quanti er over sets that exist "from the point of a world" rather in the world; see postscript A to "Counterpart Theory and Quanti ed Modal Logic", in Lewis's Philosophical Papers, Vol. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ) , pp. -.
contain numbers, persons or sh. But as mentioned at the outset, the purely formal use of Kripke models is severely limited. More interesting uses for possible worlds require the ability to speak of particular worlds, classes of worlds, functions de ned on worlds, and so on. The proposal I have given allows this, by providing a reduction of sentences like:
• there is a world in which a donkey talks
• there exists a pair of worlds and a pair of non-actual fundamental properties such that the worlds differ only by the properties swapping nomic roles
• no worlds that lack alien fundamental properties differ without differing physically
• there exists a primary intension of the term 'water' -a function that assigns to any world, w, the set of things that would count as water in w when w is "considered as actual"
The reduction does indeed assign truth conditions to these sentences via modal models whose classes of "worlds", "individuals" and "properties" may contain numbers, persons, sh, and so on, but the important thing is that the sentences are indeed assigned truth conditions. Thus, my reduction allows one to partake fully of modal metaphysics and semantics. The construction of realistic modal models assumes the notion of truth (under the Lagadonian interpretation) for de dicto sentences in the modal language, and hence assumes de dicto necessity and possibility (which are of course interde neable). These modal notions remain primitive in this paper. Thus, my account of worlds cannot be employed in a reductive account of these modal notions themselves. As explained at the outset, a reduction of talk of possibilia that employs primitive possibility and necessity is nevertheless valuable since talk of possibilia runs beyond what can be said in the language of quanti ed modal logic. The pluriverse account thus reduces talk about possibilia to de dicto sentences in the modal language.
Moreover, as explained in section 3.6, given a similarity primitive (whether c-determination or a similarity relation over individuals), the holding of a counterpart relation can be built into realistic models. The pluriverse account thus yields a theory of the truth conditions for statements about a counterpart relation holding over possibilia. Given the counterpart-theoretic account of de re modality in terms of such statements, truth conditions for de re modal sentences can be given. The usual counterpart-theoretic reduction of de re modality to de dicto modality plus similarity is thereby achieved.
Problems for the pluriverse view

Cardinality problems
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The pluriverse view runs into trouble if there are too many possible worlds or individuals to form a set. Suppose, for example, that there is no upper bound, not even an in nite upper bound, to how many (concrete) individuals may possibly exist. Then there can be no realistic models, for any modal model M has a domain of individuals, D, which is a set with some cardinality; but where κ is some larger cardinal, there will be an L-true sentence in the modal language saying that it is possible that there are least κ objects 36 ; such a sentence would be in CONSTRAINTS, but would not be true m in M. Any modal model, no matter how large, would misrepresent the pluriverse as containing an upper bound on the size of worlds. A similar problem would arise if there were no upper bound to the number of properties that could exist.
The very rst point to make about the cardinality problem is that it is not particular to the pluriverse view. Every theory of worlds encounters trouble in this area. The linguistic ersatzist, for example, may admit arbitrarily large worlds, but cannot admit worlds with so many individuals that they cannot all be members of a set (except in special cases where the objects display symmetries allowing simpler description), for a linguistic ersatz world is a maximal consistent set of sentences, and sentences themselves are also sets. That is a limitation on possibility, although a bit less severe than an upper bound on world size.
37 Similar problems confront other views that identify possible worlds with abstract entities other than sets of sentences. This is sometimes less easy to see than with linguistic ersatzism, since defenders of these views do not always 35 I thank Daniel Nolan for helpful comments on this section. 36 Given the notation of section III. D., this sentence could be the following, where S is a set of κ many variables: ∃(x : x ∈ S) (x = y : x ∈ S, y ∈ S, x and y are distinct variables). 37 Moreover, some plausible-looking recombination principles would generate proper-class sized worlds from the claim that there are proper-class many possible individuals. One presupposes "trans-world identity": for any possible individuals (perhaps drawn from different possible worlds), there is a possible world containing all of those individuals. Another drops that presupposition: for any possible individuals (again perhaps from different worlds), there is a possible world containing distinct duplicates of those individuals.
supply as rigorous assumptions about the behavior of these abstract entities as do the axioms of set theory, but the problem is no less real for that.
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Moreover, anyone who believes in possible worlds and individuals as entities, even a Lewisian modal realist, faces the problem of reconstructing applications of possible worlds talk if there are too many possible worlds or individuals to form a set. If there is no upper bound on the size of possible worlds then there can be no set of all the possible individuals and no set of all the possible worlds (ersatz or genuine). Therefore, applications of worlds talk (e.g., de ning semantic values) that require functions de ned on the space of possible worlds and individuals are in trouble. Everyone faces the cardinality problem. Below I sketch a few potential lines of response; but the question is complex and calls for further study.
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A at-footed response would be to simply deny that there can be arbitrarily many individuals, as Lewis did at one point. 40 Though theoretically simple, this response requires an unattractive restriction on what is possible. A theme of this paper has been that the theory of worlds should not put controversial constraints on what is possible.
Alternatively, one could try "technical tricks" of various sorts, in various combinations. A drastic move would be to invoke a non-standard logic or set theory on which Cantorian paradoxes with the universal set do not arise.
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Less drastically, one might invoke class theory 42 , and allow W, D, and P, in modal models to be proper classes. Since proper classes are usually not allowed to be members of further classes, some further dancing will be needed. a modal structure 〈W,r,D,P,Q,I〉. One could give up on modal structures as entities, and cash out talk of modal models as plural talk of W, r, D, P, Q and I, plus an interpretation F. While this would not rescue pluriverse sentences, it would at least allow for a rede nition of "true p in all modal models" and thus would rescue the non-linguistic version of the theory. However, if W, D, and P are proper classes then the existence of Q and I is in jeopardy since they are functions de ned on W, D and P. There is no problem if the domain of a world can never be proper-class-sized, since then there would be no need for the values of Q and I to be classes; but if in addition to arbitrarily large set-sized worlds we wish to admit (as we probably should) proper-class-sized worlds then Q and I cannot be functions construed as classes of pairs. We might now pull mereology from the bag of tricks. Q originally was a function that assigns to any w∈W a pair 〈D w ,P w 〉 of subsets of D and P. Suppose we accept a mereology of classes on which the following is coherent to require of realistic models: the members of W, the subclasses of D and the subclasses of P never overlap mereologically. We could then de ne Q as a class, each member of which is the mereological sum of a member of W, a subclass of D, and a subclass of P. For a given w∈W, D w could then be recovered -it would be the subclass of D such that it and w are both part of X, for some X∈Q; similarly for P w . The case of I is more complicated. Whether the entire pluriverse theory can be reconstructed along these lines is an open question. Yet another response leaves the de nition of a modal model intact, but alters the truth conditions for statements about possibilia. Admitting that no modal model is realistic, one might characterize a trans nite hierarchy of "near-realistic" models of increasingly large size and claim that a sentence about worlds is true iff at some point in this hierarchy the sentence is true and remains true from that point onward. However, this translation procedure would misrepresent the modal facts: the sentence 'there is an upper limit to the in nite number of individuals that exist in any one possible world' would turn out true, despite the fact that it is possible that there exist arbitrarily many individuals.
"We're not talking about that!"
A less technical objection attacks my claim that talk about possibilities concerns in nitary sentences and modal models that no one until now has bothered to characterize. This objection is not particular to the pluriverse view. One might similarly object to the claim that, all along, we have been talking about linguistic ersatz worlds, complex set-theoretic constructions out of bits of language; or spatiotemporally isolated concrete worlds; or maximal consistent states of affairs; or a ction about possible worlds; or any other proposed conception of possibilia.
The answer to all these worries is the same. Various modal concepts in the neighborhood of possible worlds form an interrelated cluster: possible worlds, possible individuals, possible states of affairs, necessity, possibility, and so on. These modal concepts are concepts of properties and relations that play certain roles vis a vis each other and vis a vis other notions. But this exhausts the nature of the modal concepts; they do not (much) constrain the intrinsic properties of candidate possible worlds and individuals. This is a sort of structuralism, if you like. Modal concepts lay down a structural requirement: our talk of possible worlds and the rest is about any structure that is suited to play the relevant role. I say that pluriverse sentences and realistic models are best suited to play this role, and that is all it takes for talk of worlds to be talk about them. 
The Pluriverse view compared with modal ctionalism
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My pluriverse view, particularly in its linguistic form, is similar in some ways to Gideon Rosen's modal ctionalism. 45 There are, however, important differences between the views that favor the ersatz pluriverse view.
According to Rosen's ctionalism, talk about possible worlds is like ordinary talk about ctional characters. Just as "there was a detective named 'Holmes"' is elliptical for "according to the Conan-Doyle stories, there was a detective named 'Holmes"', "There is a possible world in which donkeys talk" is elliptical for "According to PW, the ction of possible worlds, there is a possible world in which donkeys talk". PW consists of seven postulates, which informally capture Lewis's theory of worlds, together with "an encyclopaedia: a list of the non-modal truths about the intrinsic character of this universe." 46 The notion of truth according to, or in, a ction is an unde ned primitive of the theory. Rosen goes on to propose an analysis of modality: P is necessary iff, according to PW, P's worlds translation P* is true in all worlds; P is possible iff, according to PW, P* is true in some world.
Both ctionalism and the pluriverse theory reinterpret assertions about 44 Two other views, to which the pluriverse view bears some similarity, are worth mentioning brie y. According to Tony Roy ("In Defense of Linguistic Ersatzism", Philosophical Studies ( ): -), worlds in which non-actual individuals swap qualitative roles may be distinguished by representing those individuals with "arbitrary names", for example 'Batman' and 'Robin' in 'Batman plays role R 1 and Robin plays role R 2 ' and 'Robin plays role R 1 and Batman plays role R 2 '. But either i) these names mean nothing (since they refer to nothing) and so the sentences represent nothing, or ii) they are implicitly existentially quanti ed variables (as is suggested by Roy's remarks on p.
). In case ii), either iia) the variables are bound to quanti ers at the beginning of the sentences, in which case the sentences mean the same thing, namely ∃x∃y(x plays role R 1 and y plays role R 2 ) and the worlds have not been distinguished, or iib) the variables are bound to quanti ers outside the two sentences, in which case the view is starting to look like the pluriverse view. The other view is ): -. Roughly, Fine interprets an existential sentence about possibilia like There is some possible object that ψs as meaning possibly, there is an object that ψs , where the existential quanti er in the latter sentence is an actualist quanti er. Fine's view is attractive, but handles quanti cation over sets of possibilia (see Worlds, Times and Selves, pp.
-) and sentences attributing cross-world relations less smoothly than the pluriverse view. 45 Rosen's ction differs super cially from pluriverse sentences by being "generational": it describes the pluriverse by i) describing one world (in the encyclopaedia), and ii) supplying a principle that generates new worlds from old. The principle of generation is one of the seven postulates, speci cally, the principle of recombination:
48 ( e) The totality of universes is closed under a principle of recombination. Roughly: for any collection of objects from any number of universes, there is a single universe containing any number of duplicates of each, provided there is a spacetime large enough to hold them.
A more important difference concerns the content of the ction, not just its form. The pluriverse theory entails p everything about the pluriverse stateable from our vantage point in the actual world, whereas Rosen's ction entails much less. Instead, Rosen relies on the fact that much more is generally true in a ction than what is explicitly stated. 49 Though never explicitly mentioned, it is presumably true in the Sherlock Holmes ction that Holmes has ten toes.
My reason for preferring the pluriverse view to Rosen's ctionalism is dissatisfaction with the notion of truth in ction. If Rosen's ctionalism is to be materially adequate, that notion will need to be very different from the ordinary notion of truth in ction, and hence will be an obscure, unexplained primitive.
Rosen needs truth-in-ction because his ction does not describe the pluriverse exhaustively. But it would be bogus to take this strategy to an extreme. Imagine an extremely thin ction, consisting of a single sentence "there are other possible worlds", and a ctionalist who claimed to reduce worlds-talk to
